5. Therefore, if determinism is true, I have no free will.
I think that this way of thinking about the free will/determinism problem is the correct way. 2 There is something as plain as the nose on our face -the fact that we often have a choice about what to do --and this apparently obvious fact seems to be in direct conflict with determinism. I see the free will/determinism problem as the problem of saying whether this apparent conflict is real.
This may seem obvious -I hope it does seem obvious. But this is not how the literature sees the problem.
Through the Lens of Moral Responsibility (How not to Think about Free
Will)
In the contemporary literature, the free will/determinism problem is almost invariably viewed through the lens of moral responsibility. It is, of course, widely agreed that having free will is a necessary condition of being a morally responsible agent. But most contemporary discussions of the free will/determinism problem forge a much stronger link between questions about moral responsibility and questions about free will.
Let's begin with some particularly striking examples:
…the pessimists reply, all in a rush, that just punishment and moral condemnation implies moral guilt and guilt implies moral responsibility and moral responsibility implies freedom and freedom implies the But the concept of responsibility is a mysterious one which tends, on examination, to become increasingly opaque and to threaten variously to be incoherent or impossible or universally inapplicable… We can express the problem of responsibility in the form of the question "How, if at all, is responsibility possible? And we can express the problem of free will in the form of the question: "What must our relation to our wills be," or better, perhaps, "What kinds of beings must we be if we are ever to be responsible for the results of our wills? 4 [Susan Wolf]
I believe that libertarians hold the views they do because they believe that any satisfactory conception of freedom of the will must allows us to justify our ascriptions of moral responsibility. They might be persuaded to accept a compatibilist account of freedom of the will if it could be shown that the fact that we are free, in that sense, could be used as the basis for a justification of the claim that we are morally responsible for our actions.
[Hilary Bok]
Are we free agents? That depends on what you mean by 'free'. In this book the word 'free' will be used in what I call the ordinary, strong sense of the word. According to which to be a free agent is to be capable of being truly responsible for one's actions. 6 As I understand it, true moral responsibility is responsibility of such a kind that, if we have it, then it makes sense, at least, to suppose that it could be just to punish some of us with (eternal) torment in hell and reward others with (eternal) bliss in heaven.
[Galen Strawson]
These quoted passages, from philosophers whose views about free will and the free will/determinism problem are otherwise very different, 8 have in common the assumption that if we are not morally responsible, then we are also never free agents; to be a free agent is, according to these philosophers, to have what it takes to be morally responsible for our actions (and for blame to be deserved, or just, or justified).
I think that this way of approaching the free will/determinism problem is a mistake.
If we think about free will in this way, we are imposing a heavy burden on a class of natural facts --those facts, whatever they are, in virtue of which we have free will. We are saying that a class of natural facts constitute free will facts only if they play the role of being the justifier of praise, blame, and other practices associated with moral responsibility. Free will is assigned the burden of bridging the 'is-ought' gap, of explaining why moral responsibility is moral responsibility.
If we think about free will this way, we rule out, by stipulation, the possibility that so far as freedom is concerned, we have what it takes to be morally responsible, but we lack something else required for moral responsibility. For instance, insofar as we hold people responsible for what we believe were their past actions, it seems plausible that moral responsibility requires that we are numerically the same person through time. If that's right, then a philosophical argument for the conclusion that no one is ever numerically the same person over time is an argument, independent of free will, for the claim that no one is ever morally responsible. 9 Another example: arguably our practice of holding each other responsible includes the belief that we have the authority to demand certain kinds of conduct from other people and to respond adversely --with sanctions like public acts of blame --when these demands are not met. 10 If that's right, then a philosophical argument for the conclusion that we never have this kind of authority to make demands on other people is also an argument, independent of free will, for the claim that no one is ever morally responsible.
And if we think about free will this way, questions about what it is to have free will and to act freely (questions in the domain of the philosophy of action and metaphysics) take a back seat to questions about the nature of just or justified or deserved praise and blame (questions in the domain of moral philosophy). We start worrying about the nature of moral responsibility and whether anyone is ever really morally responsible, and moral responsibility becomes, as Wolf notes, a mysterious thing. 11 It seems urgent, then, to provide an analysis or account of moral responsibility or at least an account of what we do when we hold someone responsible. And in discussing these questions the question of free will either gets left behind or becomes problematic in all the ways that moral responsibility is problematic. And these problems have little or nothing to do with determinism.
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The problem of moral responsibility -what it is and what it takes for someone to be morally responsible --is an interesting and important problem but it is a different problem than the free will/determinism problem.
Not all philosophers who view the free will/determinism problem (and, more generally, questions about free will) through the lens of moral responsibility see the connection in the strong way that Strawson, Wolf, Bok, and Strawson see it. But the following kind of view is very common:
Granted, it's a mistake to conflate free will and moral responsibility, and granted, it is intelligible that someone -a child, for instancemight have free will without having what it takes to be morally responsible for her actions. But we care about freedom only because we care about moral responsibility, and our intuitions about what it is to have free will are clear only insofar as they are linked to moral responsibility. So we should understand the free will/determinism debate as a debate about whether determinism would deprive us of the kind of freedom that is required for moral responsibility. 13 In my conception, compatibilism is the view that determinism is compatible with whatever sort of freedom is sufficient for moral responsibility, while incompatibilism is the view that determinism is not compatible with this sort of freedom.
What is needed is an argument against the view that the freedoms that soft determinists have advocated are sufficient for moral responsibility, and I develop such an argument here.
[Derk Pereboom]
As a theory-neutral term of departure, free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in a manner necessary for moral responsibility. This is an improvement insofar as it does not impose upon an account of free will (or free agency or 'moral freedom') the burden of being the justifier of blame and insofar as it does not preclude the possibility that something other than lack of free will (or free agency or moral freedom) prevents us from being morally responsible.
But I think that this way of thinking about the free will/determinism problem is, nevertheless, a mistake. Moral responsibility still gets all the attention. Since free will (or free agency or 'moral freedom') is functionally defined as whatever it is that plays the role of satisfying the freedom requirement of moral responsibility, we cannot rely on commonsense assumptions about what counts as free will or free agency. If we want to defend the claim that we have the kind of freedom that plays this moral role, or that this kind of freedom is compatible with determinism, we will need to provide an analysis or account of this "moral freedom". And the only way of testing the adequacy of our account will be by using our intuitions about when agents are praiseworthy, blameworthy, or in some other way morally responsible for what they do.
Derk Pereboom exploits this fact with his notorious "Four Case" argument against compatibilism. 17 He claims that the compatibilist must provide an account, or at least sufficient condition, of what it is to satisfy the freedom component of moral responsibility, and he describes four cases and argues that at least one of these cases is a counterexample to each of the best compatibilist accounts, and a challenge to the possibility of any compatibilist account. 18 Pereboom's claims about his cases have been criticised. But a more fundamental objection has been overlooked. If we reject the "lens of moral responsibility" approach to questions of free will, a compatibilist can respond to Pereboom's argument by saying: "I don't know about moral responsibility. That is a different and difficult thing. My claim is only that free will is compatible with determinism. I don't have an analysis of free will, nor can I even provide a sufficient condition for having free will. But I know it when I see it, and nothing in your argument gives me any reason to believe that determinism would rob me of free will."
Defenders of this way of thinking about the free will/determinism problem would, I suspect, dismiss this objection on the grounds that they are interested only in moral freedom and moral responsibility. Some of them even go so far as to deny that we have any intuitions about free will independent of our intuitions about praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility.
But I don't think that this is right (and not just because I disagree with the claim about intuitions) 19 . There are different kinds of questions we can ask, about free will, about moral responsibility, and about the relevance of determinism to free will and to moral responsibility. and that we are morally responsible for some of our actions and I believe that determinism is compatible with free will as well as moral responsibility. But these are intelligible positions, and they should not be ruled out, in advance, by the terminology we use to discuss the free will/determinism problem.
Existential Questions
Objection: Maybe you are right to complain that some philosophers do not take sufficient care to distinguish questions about free will from questions about moral responsibility.
But surely you can't deny that free will, as we ordinarily understand it, is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of moral responsibility. After all, if we don't have free will we are always as helpless as a falling rock and blame is always unjust. So we should impose the following constraint on accounts of, or claims about, free will: that they be accounts of, or claims about, the kind of thing that is a non-trivially necessary condition of moral responsibility.
Until recently, I would have agreed. 22 But I now think that we should not insist, starting out, that free will must be something that is necessary for moral responsibility. If we insist on this, we are immediately forced into taking a position concerning a philosophical literature that appears to be hopelessly stalemated -the literature concerning Harry
Frankfurt's famous argument against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.
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Here's the problem. Suppose we have the commonsense view that to have free will is to be able to do otherwise, at least sometimes. And suppose we also say that having free will is a necessary condition for being morally responsible. So far, so good. But Frankfurt and his defenders argue that someone may be morally responsible even if she is never able to do otherwise. If they are right, then either free will is not a necessary condition of moral responsibility or we may have free will even if we are never able to do otherwise. Now, I think that Frankfurt and his followers are mistaken, and I have written several papers arguing this. 24 But I don't want to have this argument every time I write a paper on free will. So let me be explicit. In this paper, I'm not going to assume that free will has any conceptual connection with moral responsibility --not even the apparently innocuous connection of being a necessary but not sufficient condition of moral responsibility. Perhaps free will is necessary for moral responsibility; perhaps it is not.
That is not my concern here. My concern here is only with the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism. 25 I believe that viewing the free will/determinism problem through the lens of moral responsibility has distorted discussion of the problem. Our view of ourselves as free and responsible agents is so central to our lives that there is a danger of being lost in one big problem: "How, if at all, is moral responsibility possible?" (Or the only slightly smaller version of this problem: "How, if at all, is the freedom required for moral responsibility possible?") And when we think in these terms, our views tend to polarize in one of two directions: Either free will ("moral freedom") becomes as problematic as moral responsibility 26 or moral responsibility and free will ("moral freedom") become so unproblematic that it's hard to see what the fuss was about. 27 I believe that if we take away the distorting lens of moral responsibility, we will be in a better position to solve the easier, or at least smaller, or, at least, non-moral or pre-moral, problem of whether determinism would rob us of the everyday kind of free will we unreflectively suppose we have almost all the time --the kind of free will that licenses talk of alternatives and options, choices, unrealized possibilities, missed opportunities, and wasted abilities.
We will need to say more about what free will is. But let's start with determinism.
How not to Think about Determinism
Roughly stated, determinism is the conjunction of two claims: i) that we are no exception to the laws that govern everything else in the universe; and ii) that the laws state sufficient, as opposed to merely necessary, or probabilistic, conditions. More precisely, determinism is the thesis that a complete description of the intrinsic state of the world at any time t and a complete statement of the laws of nature together entail every truth about the world at every time later than t.
Let's call a possible world "deterministic" iff the thesis of determinism is true at that world; indeterministic iff the thesis of determinism is false at that world. There are different ways a world might be indeterministic. Most radically, a world might be
indeterministic by being what I will call a "lawless world"; that is, by being a world where there are no laws at all. A less radical way in which a world might be indeterministic is by being what I'll call a "limited law" world; that is, by being a world where there are laws, but some of the laws are limited in scope or application. 28 The least radical possibility, and the one that corresponds most closely to what quantum physics appears to tell us about the actual world, is that a world is indeterministic by being what I will call a "probabilistic world". A probabilistic world is a world where there are laws, and the laws are all-encompassing rather than limited in scope or application, but at least some of the fundamental laws are probabilistic rather than deterministic.
Determinism is not an ontological thesis. Determinism neither entails physicalism nor is entailed by it. There are possible worlds where determinism is true and physicalism false; e.g., worlds where minds are nonphysical things which nevertheless obey strict deterministic laws. 29 And there are possible worlds (perhaps our own) where physicalism is true and determinism is false.
It is important to distinguish determinism from some claims about causation:
UC Every event has a cause.
UEC Every event has an event-cause.
UEEC Every event has an event-cause, and no other kind of cause.
UC is the weakest claim; it says that every event has a cause, but it doesn't say anything about the entities that are the causes of events; it is consistent with the claim that the causes of events are (or include) events, facts, omissions, persisting objects or agents, or some other kind of entity. 30 UEC says that every event has at least one event-cause, but it leaves open the possibility that events also have other kinds of causes. UEEC makes the strongest claim; it says that every event has a cause, and that the causes of events are always and only events.
We should not assume that determinism either entails or is entailed by even the weakest of these claims about causation. What is clear, however, is that we should not make the assumption, almost universally made in the older literature, that determinism is (or is equivalent to) the thesis that every event has a cause. This is an important point, because some of the older arguments in the literature assume that to deny determinism is to claim that there are uncaused events.
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Determinism should not be confused with naturalism. There are different ways of formulating naturalism, but for our purposes we can define naturalism as the conjunction of two claims that say that we are no exception to the causal and nomological workings of the universe.
No Exception (Laws):
We are no exception to the laws that govern everything else in the universe.
No Exception (Causation): When we cause things to happen, we do so in a way that differs in complexity but not in kind from the way that natural objects cause things to
happen.
Note what these claims say, and what they do not say.
No Exception (Laws) says that the laws apply to us in the same way that they apply to Even though determinism is distinct from naturalism, there is a relation between the two that is worth noting. In the literature, one sometimes hears the claim that 'determinism is the worst form of naturalism', and that to be a compatibilist is to be someone who not only believes that we have free will (because she believes that naturalism is true and that free will is compatible with naturalism) but who also believes that we would have free will even if science told us that the 'worst form' of naturalism is true -that is, if the fundamental laws turn out to be strict deterministic laws. This seems right. A libertarian incompatibilist may be a naturalist because she believes that the fundamental laws are probabilistic or limited in the right kinds of ways. But her beliefs about free will are contingent on what science tells us; she draws the line at the "worst case scenario". If science told us that determinism is true, the libertarian incompatibilist would give up her belief that we have free will.
The upshot of our investigation into determinism and related claims is this: Since we don't know whether determinism is true or false we cannot think of the free will/determinism problem as the problem of reconciling our belief in naturalism with our belief that we have free will. Even if we think that the true threat to free will is naturalism, and that determinism is merely the 'worst case' of naturalism, we need to address the question of whether determinism, and not just naturalism, is compatible with free will. If we are incompatibilists, we need to argue that determinism would preclude us from having the free will we might otherwise have. And if we are compatibilists, we need to defend, not only the claim that we in fact have free will, but also the claim that we would have free will even if determinism turned out to be true. Free will defined so that it is conceptually linked to moral responsibility does not fit these constraints. At one time, the fact that we have the kind of freedom that justifies blame and punishment might have counted as a Moorean fact. But this is no longer true; these days it is easy to raise doubts about moral responsibility without saying a word about determinism.
Free will defined so that it is conceptually connected to something valuable or 'worth wanting' does not fit these constraints. Nor does free will defined in some inherently vague way like "that which makes us dignified and worthy of respect" or ' that which makes us different from everything else in nature'.
You may wonder: What could free will possibly be, if it is to satisfy these constraints?
I gave my answer at the beginning of this paper. We should understand the free will/determinism problem as a problem about choice. Our core conception of ourselves as agents with free will consists in our belief that we are often in situations where we both make and also have a choice.
You offer me cheesecake or chocolate mousse; I pick the mousse. I'm at a fork in the road and must decide between the winding scenic coastal route, and the speedy but boring freeway; I take the freeway. The speeches are finally over, and the vote has been called: all in favor, raise their hands; I raise my hand. We are in situations like these daily, and in such situations all of the following seem to be true:
1. We believe that we have options (alternative courses of action): that is, we believe that there are at least two different things we are able to do. (Eat one dessert or another, take one road or the other, raise our hand or keep it lowered). Call these options 'A' and 'B'.
2. We deliberate (or ponder, ruminate, consult our feelings, etc.) between A and B.
3. We decide to do A. (We make up our minds, make a choice, form an intention.)
4. We do A.
5. The belief that we had before we made up our mind was a true belief. While we were deliberating, we really were able to do A and we really were able to do B.
We are, of course, sometimes mistaken about what our options are. We ponder the offerings on the menu, trying to decide between the mousse and the cheesecake, not realizing that the mousse is not available today. We ponder going out for a drive, having forgotten that the car is at the garage. In these situations, 1-4 may be true, but 5 is false.
This shows that we are not entitled to infer, from the fact that we deliberate between A and B, that A and B are both options for us. We may be mistaken about what we are able to do. But it seems incredible to suppose that we are always mistaken.
Call the belief that we are often, or at least sometimes, in situations where our beliefs about our options are correct and 1-5 are all true: Choice.
I take Choice to be an uncontroversial part of our commonsense view of ourselves as agents with free will. (The core part of that view.) Choice seems as obviously and undeniably true as other facts that only a philosopher would question: the fact that there are tables and chairs, the fact that things continue to exist through time, the fact that I have a pair of hands.
I call Choice a Moorean fact. Like the fact that there are tables and chairs and continuing things, the fact that we are sometimes able to do more than one thing is more obvious and self-evident than any analysis that we can give of it. We do not need to give arguments or provide an analysis in order to defend our belief in a Moorean fact.
In The free-will thesis is the thesis that we are sometimes in the following position with respect to a contemplated future act: we simultaneously have both the following abilities: the ability to perform that act and the ability to refrain from performing that act.
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[Peter van Inwagen]
How not to think about the Consequence Argument
We need to be forced by argument to give up our belief that a Moorean fact is a fact.
Appeal to intuition is not an argument. We already know that taking determinism seriously causes people to doubt the Moorean fact. The philosophical problem is to decide whether these intuitions -this way of responding to the problem -is justified.
There is only one argument in the literature for the conclusion that if determinism is true, the Moorean fact of Choice does not obtain. 42 It is the Consequence argument, due, most famously, to Peter van Inwagen. 43 Here is an informal statement of the argument: If determinism is true, then our acts are the logical consequence of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But we don't have a choice about what happened before we were born, and we don't have a choice about what the laws of nature are. Therefore, we don't have a choice about the consequences of these things, including our present acts.
It can't be denied that this way of stating the argument tends to produce the desired effect. Our attention is directed to two apparently undeniable 44 facts: that we have no choice about the remote past or the laws of physics, and that at a deterministic world everything, including our present acts, can be logically deduced from facts about the remote past and the laws. Thinking in these terms causes us to think: "If determinism is true, then everything has already been decided, long before I was born. There is nothing that remains up to me. I never have a choice about anything, not even in those situations in which it seems clear as day that I am able to do more than one thing."
The argument has convinced many. It has, I think, made incompatibilism respectable again. But it has also been widely misunderstood, and it has not received nearly the attention from compatibilists that it should have received. Here is a typical response, from Hilary Bok:
"I have described two conceptions of possibility: the broad compatibilist conception of possibility and possibility tout court…van Inwagen's argument against compatibilism presupposes rather than establishes, the claim that the sense of possibility relevant to libertarian freedom is possibility tout court.' Here is van Inwagen's response to this kind of compatibilist response:
"Many philosophers, in attempting to spell out the concept of free will, use the phrase 'could have done otherwise'. I did so myself in An Essay on Free Will. Nowadays, however, I very deliberately avoid this phrase. I avoid it because "could have done otherwise" is ambiguous and (experience has shown) its ambiguity has caused much confusion in discussions of free will… A whole chapter of Daniel Dennett's first book on free will was written to no purpose because he didn't realize that 'could have done'
sometimes means 'might have done' (and this 'might' is ambiguous; it has both an ontological and an epistemic sense) and sometimes 'was able to do'. " what the word means. And, therefore, 'free will', 'incompatibilist free will', 'compatibilist free will' and 'libertarian free will' are four names for one and the same thing. If this thing is a property, they are four names for the property is on some occasions able to do otherwise. If this thing is a power or ability, they are four names for the power or ability to do otherwise than one in fact does."
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In these passages, van Inwagen makes two important points --that it is a strategic mistake to discuss questions of free will in terms of 'can' or 'could', and that it is a mistake to think that compatibilists and incompatibilists mean different things by 'able'. I agree with both points. It doesn't follow, however, that whenever we say, in ordinary English, that someone is to do something, we always mean the same thing. Perhaps the locution is ambiguous between two or even three different meanings. 47 But since we are anchoring our discussion to the Moorean fact of Choice, this should ensure that we are discussing the same thing. 48 The question before us, then, is whether determinism has the consequence that the ability to do otherwise that we take for granted whenever we make choices is an ersatz ability, an illusion, no ability at all. Could it be that we are always mistaken when we believe that we have a choice about what to do?
We need to take a closer look at a more precisely formulated version of the Consequence Argument. The version I will discuss is due to David Lewis in his classic "Are We Free to Break the Laws?" 49 , a paper that van Inwagen commends as "the finest essay that has ever been written in defense of compatibilism -possibly the finest essay that has ever been written about any aspect of the free will problem". Consequence argument claims that if we suppose that a deterministic agent has ordinary abilities, we are forced to credit her with incredible abilities as well.
Here's the argument: Suppose, for reductio, that determinism is true, and someone, call her Dana, did not raise her hand but had the ordinary ability to do so. If Dana had exercised her ordinary ability -if she had raised her hand --then either the remote past or the laws of physics would have been different (would have to have been different). But if that's so, then Dana has at least one of two incredible abilities -the ability to change the remote past or the ability to change the laws. But to suppose that Dana has either of these incredible abilities is absurd. So we must reject the claim that Dana had the ordinary ability to raise her hand.
The first thing to note about this argument is that it relies on a claim about counterfactuals. The argument says that one of these counterfactuals is true:
Different Past: If Dana had raised her hand, the remote past would have been different.
Different Laws:
If Dana had raised her hand, the laws would have been different.
Both these counterfactuals seem incredible to us, because we are not used to thinking in terms of determinism, but we are good at evaluating counterfactuals, especially those counterfactuals that we entertain in contexts of choice. And when we contemplate Dana's options, we assume that:
Same Past and Laws: If Dana had raised her hand, the past and the laws would still have been exactly the same.
So both Different Past and Different Laws strike us as false. But that doesn't mean they are false, and if determinism is true, at least one of these counterfactuals is true.
Our best theory of counterfactuals -David Lewis's theory -tells us that our commonsense assumption about the past is correct and Different Past is false.
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According to Lewis, if Dana had exercised her ordinary ability to raise her hand, the past would have been exactly the same as it actually was until a time shortly before she chose to raise her hand. 52 So Dana's ordinary ability to raise her hand does not entail an incredible ability to change the past.
Lewis's theory of counterfactuals does have the consequence that Different Laws is true.
But Different Laws sounds more incredible than it is. If we don't understand Lewis's theory of counterfactuals, we might think that Different Laws means:
New Set of Laws: If Dana had raised her hand, our laws would have been replaced by a new and entirely different set of laws.
But this is not how we evaluate counterfactuals. We evaluate counterfactuals by considering the closest worlds where the antecedent is true, and the closest worlds are worlds where there are no gratuitous changes from actuality. To suppose a wholly new and different system of laws is to suppose a gratuitous change. Lewis's theory tells us that if Dana had exercised her ordinary ability to raise her hand, the past would have been exactly the same until the occurrence of a small and inconspicuous event -an extra neuron firing in Dana's brain -which marks the divergence from our actual history.
Lewis calls this event a 'divergence miracle' (or 'law-breaking event'), since it is an event that is unlawful by the standards of our laws. But he tells us that it's a mistake to think that at these non-actual closest worlds one of our laws has been replaced by a contrary law; rather, we should think that one of our laws has been replaced by something that might be described either as an "almost-law" or, perhaps, as a version of the broken law, "complicated and weakened by a clause to permit the one exception. to the claim that Dana has an incredibly ability --the ability to break the laws."
But -and this is Lewis's main point in his reply to van Inwagen -the ability to break a law is the ability to cause a law-breaking event. Dana has this ability only if she has the ability to cause the divergence miracle. But she doesn't have this ability. The divergence miracle is over and done with by the time that she acts. 54 There is more to be said, but I believe that Lewis's reply succeeds. (I also believe, though I cannot defend this here, that the success of his reply does not require the truth of any particular philosophical account of lawhood.) The Consequence Argument fails.
Compatibilists do not need to hide behind different senses or conceptions or kinds of ability, nor do they need to fear that the ability to do otherwise that a deterministic agent has is a "weaker" or "less robust" ability than the ability the libertarian claims we have.
In the relevant sense, the ordinary sense that we use when we deliberate for the purpose of making a choice, deterministic agents are able to do otherwise.
How to Think about Free Will
I would like to close by saying a bit about the nature of the Moorean fact of Choice.
Consider a typical choice situation. I am considering whether to vote 'yes' by raising my hand. I think for a moment, and then keep my hand lowered. I refrained from voting 'yes', but I was able to vote 'yes' because I was able to raise my hand. I had the ordinary ability to do so. Nothing stopped me from doing so. Or so it seems.
What are the truth-makers of this fact --the fact that I was able to vote "yes" by raising my hand?
A simple answer, once widely accepted, but now just as widely rejected is:
Simple Conditional Analysis: "I was able to raise my hand" =(def.) "if I had chosen (or decided, intended, tried, wanted, etc.) to raise my hand, I would have raised my hand".
More generally, at one time the debate about the free will/determinism problem was regarded as a debate about whether 'could have done otherwise' or 'is able to do otherwise' can be analysed in terms of some kind of counterfactual or subjunctive conditional. Compatibilists argued that 'can' is 'hypothetical' or 'conditional' or "constitutionally iffy"; incompatibilists argued that 'can' is "categorical" and not
analysable. There was a rich literature of cases, and while the discussion did not formulate the problem in terms of what I have been calling the Moorean fact, it was, in my view, an improvement over the current free will literature in this respect: it did not view free will through the lens of moral responsibility. The debate was focused on the meaning of 'can' or 'could' or 'is able to' claims, rather than their moral or normative significance. 55 It is an unfortunate fact about the history of the free will literature that this debate came to an end sometime in the mid-sixties, shortly before the development of the Lewis/Stalnaker possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals. 56 The debate came to an end because everyone agreed that the attempt to provide a Conditional Analysis of 'could have done otherwise' was doomed in principle. 57 Compatibilists had to look to other strategies for defending compatibilism, and the years since then have seen a wide variety of different strategies: the Strawsonian program 58 ; Frankfurt's argument against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and the rise of Semi-Compatibilism 59 ; accounts of free will in terms of one's "deep" or "real" self 60 ; and, more generally, the increasing tendency to view the free will/determinism problem through the lens of moral responsibility.
But I digress. Here's an example of the kind of case that convinced everyone that the attempt to provide a Conditional Analysis of 'is able to do X' is flawed in principle.
Mary is under general anesthesia, which temporarily prevents her from thinking and thus prevents her from deciding or choosing to do anything. If she choose (or decided, intended, etc.) to raise her arm, she would have to be conscious, and if she were conscious she would succeed in raising her arm, if she chose. But since she is in fact unconscious, she is unable to raise her arm. So it is true that if Mary chose to raise her arm, she would, but false that Mary is able to raise her arm.
The moral drawn was that abilities are 'categorical' rather than 'iffy'. Mary's unconscious state has changed certain categorical properties of her brain, the properties that enable her to make choices on the basis of reasoning and deliberation. It is because she lacks these categorical properties that she lacks the ability to decide or choose whether to raise her arm. And because she lacks the ability to decide or choose to raise her arm, she also lacks the ability to raise her arm.
I think that this way of diagnosing the case is a mistake. I agree that the Simple Conditional Analysis is false. And I agree that this case shows that part of the truthmaker of an ability claim is something that is 'categorical', as the old literature would have said, or, as we would say today, has a causal basis in the intrinsic properties of the person. 61 It is because general anesthesia has changed the intrinsic properties of Mary's brain that she (temporarily) lacks the ability to make decisions and choices on the basis of deliberation. But I don't think that the ability to raise one's arm requires the ability to deliberate about the pro's and con's of arm-raising; a child might have the first ability without having the second. I think that we should say that Mary has temporarily lost the second ability -the ability to decide or choose to raise her arm --while retaining the ability the child has. After all, general anaesthesia is not a paralytic; it hasn't changed the intrinsic properties of the parts of Mary's brain and body that enable Mary to move her arm.
But we don't have to settle this point here. My aim here is not to defend an analysis of ability; my aim is to say a bit more about the nature of the Moorean fact of Choice. The lesson to be learned from Mary's case is that at least part of the truth-maker of the Moorean fact is constituted by the intrinsically-based abilities that a choice-maker has. have what it takes to go for a walk, but, unfortunately for me, I am in a situation in which something prevents me from exercising my ability.
But this kind of situation is not the norm. Ordinarily, when we deliberate and make a choice between what we take to be two options, A and B, we've got the ability and also the opportunity to choose and also to do both these things. Ordinarily, when I choose to stay home rather than go for a walk, I have the opportunity as well as the ability to go for a walk (and, of course, the opportunity as well as the ability to decide whether to stay or to go).
How should we understand the ability/opportunity distinction? I suggest the following: The borderline between ability and opportunity may be unclear or disputed insofar as it is unclear, or in dispute, where the boundaries of the person (at the relevant time) are. I suggested a physical boundary ("under the skin"), but this is over-simple since implanted devices controlled by nefarious neurosurgeons are under a person's skin but are not part of her. But we can set these borderline and difficult cases aside so far as the free will/determinism problem is concerned. For that problem is to decide whether determinism really has the shocking consequence it appears to have: that no one ever has a choice about anything.
Here is an operational test (not a definition) of when someone is able to do something in the sense relevant to Choice. Suppose that I have the ability to do something -to go for a walk, to ride a bike, to get to the airport in time to catch a plane. And suppose, as we do I propose that this is all that there is to the Moorean fact of Choice. The Moorean fact is the fact that we are often in situations in which we exercise our ability to choose and to do something A while having the ability as well as the opportunity to choose and to do something else B instead. Any argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with the Moorean fact must, then, be an argument for one of two surprising claims: that determinism has the consequence that our abilities go out of existence whenever we don't exercise them or that determinism has the consequence that we lose our opportunities whenever we don't take advantage of them. 19 I don't care much for the recently over-used term 'intuition', but I will be arguing that our intuitions (better: core commonsense beliefs) about free will are based on everyday cases of making and having a choice. The choice may be one for which we hold the person responsible, but it need not be.
20 P.F. Strawson, Wolf, and Bok answer "yes" to the two Existential questions and "yes" to the two Compatibility questions. Galen Strawson answers "no" to the two Existential questions, and, "no" to the two Compatibility questions; however, on his view it makes no difference whether or not determinism is true; either way, we would not have free will or be morally responsible. 21 It might look as though Markosian can allow these combinations of answers because he explicitly introduces 'moral freedom' as a technical term and because he issues two disclaimers -he does not assume that moral responsibility and moral freedom require the ability to do otherwise and he acknowledges that moral freedom "may be very different from 'freedom' in some other popular senses of the word." But Markosian in effect appropriates 'free will' as a term for moral freedom by defining the Free Will Thesis as the thesis that some actions are morally free and compatibilism as the thesis that the Free Will thesis is compatible with determinism. Someone who wants to respond to the two Compatibility questions by answering 'no' and 'yes' is forced to say something like: 'If determinism were true, there would be some sense of 'free' in which I would be less free than I believe I am, but I would still have the freedom that makes the Free Will Thesis true, so I would still be morally responsible." ("A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation, ibid, p.2) 22 An example of how I recently viewed the problem "through the lens": In my "Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account", Philosophical Topics 32 (2004), Agency, John Fischer, ed. , 427-450. " I say, at p. 428: "the 'can' relevant to free will is the 'can' that we have in mind in contexts in which we raise questions about moral responsibility." I was closer to being right in an older paper in which I describe a view that I call Simple Compatibilism and then say: "this search for a more sophisticated Compatibilist theory is a mistake. I think that Simple Compatibilism is basically right, not just as an account of freedom of action, but also as an account of free will. It's not, however, a theory of moral responsibility and much confusion will be avoided once we realize this. 35 Note that a libertarian (or other incompatibilist) need not reject No Exception (Causation). This is most clear in the case of libertarians who explicitly endorse eventcausation and the claim that free will is possible at probabilistic worlds (cf. Kane, ibid) but even libertarians who defend agent-causation and who insist that free will is possible only at limited law worlds (cf. O'Connor, ibid) can endorse No Exception (Causation), provided that they argue that agent-causation is a species of primitive object-causation.
36
In his "Elusive Knowledge", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996), 549-567, David Lewis characterizes a Moorean fact as "one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary." I like this definition, but it may be stronger than I need. If you prefer a more epistemically neutral characterization, you may think of a Moorean fact as a commonsense platitude or a belief that seems so obviously true that we typically don't bother saying it. I thank Joe Campbell for pressing me on this point. 37 Here I disagree with some of the stronger claims about the evidential status of Moorean facts made by recent defenders of commonsense against the skeptic. 38 Nor am I making any claim about knowledge. The free will/determinism problem isn't a problem about whether we know that we have free will or whether we know that free will is compatible with determinism; it's a problem about whether we have free will and whether our having free will is compatible with determinism. (It's a problem within metaphysics, not epistemology.) If the epistemic skeptic is right, then we don't know that we have hands, let alone that we have free will. My intent in calling Choice a Moorean fact is only to point out that our belief that we have free will is as firmly embedded within commonsense as our belief that we have hands, that the world didn't begin to exist five minutes ago, that there are tables and chairs and other minds. It has whatever epistemic status these other beliefs have. 39 I offer these quotes as evidence that van Inwagen sees the free will/determinism problem in the way that I do --as a problem about Choice. But in his recent paper, "How to think about the Problem of Free Will" Journal of Ethics, 2008 12, 337-341, van Inwagen describes a larger problem that he calls "the problem of free will" but which I
